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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE 
OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This appeal is from the trial court's Summary Judgment. The 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)j. The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah has transferred this case to the Utah Court 
of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4). 
Plaintiff, Chance Collar Company, (herein referred to as 
"Chance Collar11) filed this action seeking to obtain possession 
of its drill collars. Defendant, Thompson, alleged that he was a 
good faith purchaser of the drill collars and was entitled to 
retain possession. In a companion case, LOR, Inc., vs. Lane 
Murray dba Rocky Mountain Sales and Samuel C. Thompson, Civil No. 
12,386, a jury found that Defendant, Thompson, was not a good 
faith purchaser, but had committed fraud in acquiring similar 
oilfield equipment in the same transaction in which he acquired 
Chance Collar's drill collars. The trial court granted 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment finding that Defendant, 
Thompson's, claim was barred by the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel and that Chance Collar was entitled to take possession 
of its drill collars. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented in this appeal are as follows: 
1. Whether Defendant is collaterally estopped from 
claiming title to Plaintiff's drill collars as a good faith 
purchaser when a jury in the LOR case decided that he acquired 
1 
the drill collars by fraud? 
2. Whether certified copies of the pleadings, jur 
instructions and verdict of the LOR case and the fact that Judg< 
Davidson presided in the LOR case provided a sufficient record oi 
which to base his ruling of collateral estoppel in this case? 
3. Whether Defendant can raise, for the first time oi 
appeal, the issue as to whether the record before Judge Davidsoi 
was sufficient? 
4. Whether alleged disputed facts, unrelated tc 
circumstances giving rise to collateral estoppel, prevent entr} 
of summary judgment? 
STATUTES INVOLVED 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Chance Collar filed this action seeking to recover its drill 
collars alleging that Defendant, Thompson, had fraudulently 
acquired the drill collars in concert with Defendant, Lane 
Murray, that any title Defendant, Thompson, had to the drill 
collars was voidable and Chance Collar was entitled to recover 
its drill collars. (R.22) Defendant, Thompson, in his Answer, 
claimed to be a good faith purchaser of the drill collars and 
claimed to have paid value for the drill collars. (R.47) 
In a companion case entitled LOR, Inc., vs. Lane Murray dba 
Rocky Mountain Sales and Samuel C. Thompson, Civil No. 12,386, 
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also filed in Uintah County, Utah, LOR, Inc., (referred to herein 
as LOR) also sought to recover possession of its drill collars. 
Defendant, Thompson, in the LOR case also claimed that he was a 
good faith purchaser having paid value for the drill collars. 
(R.181-193) The case of LOR, Inc., vs. Lane Murray dba Rocky 
Mountain Sales and Samuel C. Thompson, was set for a jury trial 
beginning March 26, 1985. (R.194) The Chance Collar Company vs. 
Lane Murray dba Rocky Mountain Sales and Samuel C. Thompson, was 
set for jury trial beginning April 10, 1985. (R.130) 
The LOR case was tried, beginning March 26, 1985, before a 
jury. The Judge presiding over the case was Judge Richard C. 
Davidson. The jury was instructed regarding fraud, duties of 
good faith in business transactions, the effect of fraud on 
acquiring title and the elements necessary to be a good faith 
purchaser. The jury was then instructed to determine whether 
Defendant, Thompson, as a good faith purchaser, owned the drill 
collars or whether LOR was entitled to the drill collars (R.199-
208, Addendum 1) The jury ruled in favor of LOR (R.196) finding 
that Defendant, Thompson, had not acquired the drill collars as a 
good faith purchaser but through a fraudulent transaction with 
Lane Murray. 
Chance Collar then moved for summary judgment on the basis 
that the transaction and facts by which Defendant, Thompson, 
claimed to have acquired the Chance Collar drill collars was the 
identical transaction as in the LOR case and since the jury had 
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ruled that Defendant, Thompson, was not a good faith purchaser i 
that transaction he was collaterally estopped from raising tha 
issue in the present case. The trial court granted the Motio 
for Summary Judgment finding that (a) the issue in this cas 
(Chance Collar) and the LOR case regarding Defendant's claim t 
possession was the same; (b) the evidence in the LOR cas 
involved both the LOR and Chance Collar drill collars and showe< 
a common fraudulent scheme and transaction; (c) the jury ha< 
ruled against Defendant, Thompson, regarding his claim o 
ownership of the drill collars; (d) the issue had been fully an< 
fairly litigated and therefore, Chance Collar was entitled tc 
possession of its drill collars. (R.214, Addendum 2) 
B. Statement of the Facts 
The Statement of Facts will refer both to the transcript 
from the LOR trial, which has been designated as part of the 
record on appeal and the court record in the Chance Collar case. 
References to the LOR transcript will be with a (T). References 
to the court record in the Chance Collar case will be referred tc 
by (R). 
LOR and Chance Collar are competitors in the oilfield 
industry. Their business is selling and renting oilfield 
equipment. (T.53) Defendant, Thompson, owns a machine shop where 
he repairs equipment and works as a machinist. (T.110) 
On May 25, 1983 Lane Murray contacted LOR, Inc., with a 
request to purchase drill collars. (T.10) Drill collars are 
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oilfield equipment used to add weight to the drill bit- (T.9) As 
one of his credit references Lane Murray gave the name of 
Defendant, Thompson. (T.10-11) On August 3, 1983 Lane Murray 
contacted Chance Collar Company and ordered drill collars, also 
listing Defendant, Thompson, as one of his credit references. 
(T.53-54) Lane Murray and Defendant, Thompson, had adjoining 
offices in Vernal, Utah. (T.36) Both LOR and Chance Collar 
delivered the drill collars to that location and the collars were 
put in a yard which was owned by Defendant, Thompson. (T.37, 55) 
When Chance Collar and LOR did not receive payment for their 
drill collars an investigation was started. On September 6, 1983 
Hugh Vogel, on behalf of Chance Collar, and Agee Spidle, on 
behalf of LOR, attempted to locate Mr. Murray and the drill 
collars. (T.38-39, 56-57) They were unable to locate Mr. Murray. 
Mr. Spidle located LOR's drill collars in a yard owned by Land 
and Marine. (T.39) The agent for Land and Marine informed Mr. 
Spidle that Land and Marine was storing the drill collars for 
Defendant, Thompson, because he claimed a lien for machine work 
on the drill collars. (T.39) Mr. Vogel and Mr. Spidle went to 
Mr. Thompson's yard, met with his machinist and inquired as to 
the location of the Chance Collar drill collars. (T.40, 56) Mr. 
Thompson's machinist said that the drill collars had been in the 
yard the previous Friday, but must have been moved over the 
weekend and he did not know where they had been moved. (T.40, 56-
57) Mr. Spidle and Mr. Vogel then contacted Mr. Thompson and 
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inquired as to what interest he claimed in the drill collars, a 
well as where they were located. Mr. Thompson stated that he ha 
been paid in full for the work he did on the LOR drill collar 
and that he had no interest in the collars. He also stated tha 
he had jointed the Chance Collar collars, but he did not kno1 
where the drill collars were, and that Lane Murray had them 
(T.41, 58) When the collars were eventually located they were ii 
a yard owned by a friend of Defendant, Thompson, had been move< 
there by Defendant (T.124-125) and had not been jointed. (T.59) 
On September 22, 1983, Dick Werner, on behalf of LOR 
located Lane Murray. Mr. Murray stated that he had just sold th( 
drill collars and would be paid in two weeks. He refused tc 
disclose the name of the buyer. (T.82) Neither LOR or Chance 
Collar have been able to locate Mr. Murray since that date. 
LOR did not get paid and the drill collars remained at Lane 
and Marine's yard. On October 20, 1983 LOR filed a lawsuit 
against Mr. Murray and obtained a Writ of Attachment attaching 
the drill collars. (R.182, T.92) Chance Collar, with the 
assistance of the FBI, located its drill collars in February of 
1984. (T.59) After LOR attached its drill collars Defendant, 
Thompson, on December 5, 1983, for the first time claimed that he 
was the owner of both the LOR and Chance Collar drill collars. 
(T.83, 166-167) 
Defendant, Thompson, admitted that the drill collars had 
been stored in his yard. (T.121) and that he had the Chance 
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Collar drill collars moved to a friend's place, 20 miles from 
Vernal, (T.124-125) where the FBI located them. Defendant, 
Thompson, claimed that he purchased both the LOR and the Chance 
Collar drill collars from Lane Murray on August 8, 1983. (T.126) 
He claimed he paid in excess of $94,000.00 for the collars. 
(T.168-169) He gave no valid explanation as to why he moved the 
collars and denied ownership until December 5, 1983. Defendant, 
Thompson, claimed he paid for both groups of drill collars 
through a combination of trading machine work and a check for 
$25,123.60 dated October 7, 1983. (T.135, 169-170) Defendant, 
Thompson's, records which he claimed supports this claim, had 
invoices out of sequence, dates changed and notations in 
different handwriting and ink color than the original part of the 
invoice. (T.89-90) The check for $25,123.60 which Defendant 
claimed paid for the drill collars had a notation stating "re: 
gaskets, nuts and collars" (T.90) which writing was different 
from the other writing on the check. (T.91) 
In January, 1984 Defendant intervened in the LOR lawsuit. 
(R.183, 186) The LOR drill collars were sold, by stipulation of 
the parties, with the money being held by the court. The 
Complaint, in the Chance Collar case, was amended to add 
Defendant (R.21) and after a hearing, an injunction was entered 
which prohibited Defendant from disposing of the drill collars. 
(R.92) In both cases Chance Collar and LOR claimed Defendant 
used fraud to acquire the drill collars while he claimed to be a 
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good faith purchaser for value. 
The LOR case was set for trial before a jury to begin Marc 
26, 1985. The Chance Collar case was set to follow immediatel 
thereafter, before a jury beginning April 10, 1985. At the LQ 
trial representatives from LOR, Chance Collar and Defendan 
testified regarding the transactions involving both sets of dril 
collars. (T.32, 52, 67) Defendant's claim as to how he acquire* 
and paid for both sets of drill collars was identical and aros« 
out of the same transaction. The jury was instructed that « 
party who acquires title to goods by fraud acquires voidable 
title and that the seller of the goods can rescind th< 
transaction and retake possession of the goods. (R.199-205) Th< 
jury was also instructed that a party having voidable title coulc 
transfer good title to a good faith purchaser for value and whal 
was necessary to be a good faith purchaser. (R.205-207) The jur} 
was then instructed that if it found that Defendant, Thompson, 
was a good faith purchaser he was entitled to the proceeds fron 
the drill collars and damages, but if he was not a good faith 
purchaser then LOR was entitled to the proceeds from its drill 
collars. 
Counsel, for both parties, addressed the jury on whether 
Defendant acquired the drill collars by fraud or as a good faith 
purchaser. (T.260-266, 278-282) The jury returned its verdict 
finding in favor of LOR and finding that Defendant, Thompson, was 
not a good faith purchaser. (R.196) Based on the jury verdict 
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the court then entered its Order finding LOR was entitled to the 
proceeds from the sale of its drill collars and that Defendant, 
Thompson's, claim was dismissed with prejudice. (R.197) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Defendant claimed that he acquired both LOR's and 
Chance Collar's drill collars as a good faith purchaser. The 
facts relating to his acquisition of both sets of drill collars 
is identical. Both LOR and Chance Collar claimed that those 
facts constituted fraud while Defendant claimed those facts 
showed he was a good faith purchaser. Defendant presented that 
issue to a jury in the LOR case. In the trial of the LOR case 
the jury decided that the facts supported LOR and Chance Collar's 
claims of fraud. Defendant should be collaterally estopped from 
relitigating that issue. 
2. Judge Richard C. Davidson presided at the LOR trial, 
heard the witnesses testify, listened to argument by counsel and 
also had certified copies of the pleadings, jury instructions and 
verdict from the LOR case when he signed and entered the Summary 
Judgment. That information provided a substantial record on 
which Judge Davidson based his decision. The Defendant never 
objected to the sufficiency of the record or attempted to 
supplement the record. He should not be allowed to complain 
about the record for the first time on appeal. 
3. The Summary Judgment, based on collateral estoppel, 
arose from Defendant's claim of how he acquired the drill 
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collars. The time period involved was August through December o 
1983. The Defendant's only defense to the Motion for Summar 
Judgment was that there was a dispute as to the day in July, 198 
when two telephone calls were made relating to credit. The tria 
court properly ruled that the telephone calls in July, 1983 wa 
not material to the question of collateral estoppel, was no 
relevant to Defendant's claim of how he acquired the dril 
collars and did not preclude entry of Summary Judgment. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. DEFENDANT IS BARRED FROM CLAIMING THAT HE IS 
A GOOD FAITH PURCHASER OF THE CHANCE COLLAR DRILL 
COLLARS BECAUSE A JURY HAS ALREADY RULED THAT HE 
ACQUIRED THE COLLARS BY FRAUD. 
The issue in both the LOR and Chance Collar cases was 
whether Defendant, Thompson, was a good faith purchaser of the 
drill collars or acquired the same by fraud in concert with Lane 
Murray. The facts regarding Defendants acquisition of both sets 
of drill collars was the same. The drill collars were delivered 
to Thompson's yard. He then moved the collars to other yards. On 
September 6, 1983, when contacted by representatives from LOR and 
Chance Collar, he denied any claim to the drill collars. (T.38-
39) It was not until December 5, 1983 when the LOR drill collars 
had been seized pursuant to a Writ of Attachment that he claimed 
to have purchased the drill collars. (T.83, 166) His claim for 
purchasing the drill collars was that he had acquired the drill 
collars on August 8, 1983 from Lane Murray and that he paid for 
them through a series of trading transactions. (T.12 6, 169-170) 
Since the issues are the same, the facts are the same, the 
Defendant is the same and the issues have been fully and fairly 
litigated, the trial court acted correcting in ruling that 
Defendant, Thompson, was collaterally estopped from litigating 
the issue a second time. 
Collateral estoppel applies when; (1) the issue decided in a 
prior adjudication is identical with the one presented in the 
action in question; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits; 
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(3) the party against whom the plea is asserted, is a party, o 
in privity to the party, to the prior adjudication; and (4) th 
issue was competently, fully and fairly litigated. Copper Stat 
Thrift and Loan vs. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387 (Utah 1987), Wilde vs 
Mid-Century Insurance Company, 635 P.2d 417 (Utah 1981), Searl 
Brothers vs. Searle, 588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978). The factual issu 
that was decided in the prior action should be the same factua 
issue presented in the second action and that issue must b< 
essential to the resolution of the prior suit. Copper Stat* 
Thrift and Loan vs. Bruno, supra, Robertson vs. Campbell, 67-
P.2d 1226 (Utah 1983). Collateral estoppel may be invoked b] 
either the Plaintiff or the Defendant in the subsequent action 
It is not necessary that the party asserting collateral estoppel 
be a party to or in any way connected to the previous lawsuit, 
The party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must be z 
party or in privity to the party who lost the issue in the prioi 
case. Robertson vs. Campbell, at 1230. The purpose oi 
collateral estoppel is to prevent relitigation of issues which e 
party has already litigated, to save the cost of multiple 
lawsuits, and prevent inconsistent decisions. Mel Trimble Real 
Estate vs. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 P. 2d 451, 453 (Utah 
1988) . 
There is no question in this case that Defendant, Thompson, 
is the same party whom the jury ruled against in the LOR case, 
that the decision by the jury was final, on the merits and that 
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the issue was completely, fully and fairly litigated. The 
question raised by the Defendant is whether the issue was the 
same in the LOR case and the Chance Collar case. Several Utah 
cases have considered that question and given guidance on making 
that decision. 
In Copper State Thrift and Loan vs. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387 
(Utah 1987) Michael Bruno and Stephen Bruno signed as co-makers 
on a Note. Stephen Bruno filed for bankruptcy. At the 
confirmation hearing in the Bankruptcy Court the Court found that 
there was an agreement between Stephen Bruno and Copper State 
Bank to accept the collateral as full satisfaction for the Note. 
Copper State then sued Michael Bruno on the Note. The Utah Court 
of Appeals held that Copper State was collaterally estopped by 
the decision rendered by the Bankruptcy Court. The Court held 
that the factual issue regarding payment of the Note was the same 
and therefore, Copper State Bank was bound by the decision of the 
Bankruptcy Court even as it related to Michael Bruno. 
In Robertson vs. Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1983) a jury 
ruled that a will was invalid because the signer of the will, 
Marinus Johnson, had acted under undue influence. The parties 
then entered into a second lawsuit regarding the validity of a 
trust executed by Marinus Johnson. The Defendants, which had 
been the losing parties in the will litigation, took the position 
that collateral estoppel did not apply because it was a different 
issue, arguing that the issue in the first case was the validity 
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of a will and the issue in the second case was the validity of 
trust. The court held that the Defendants were collaterall 
estopped. In making that decision the court said: 
The applicability of collateral estoppel does not 
depend on whether the claims for relief are the same, 
(citations omitted) What is critical is whether the 
issue that was actually litigated in the first suit was 
essential to resolution of that suit and is the same 
factual issue as that raised in a second suit. 
The issue in the instant case which was previously 
litigated against the defendant is whether the 
defendant exercised undue influence over the deceased 
at the time of the making of the documents in question. 
Id. at 1230. 
In Biri-Newport, Inc. , vs. Leber, 739 P.2d 614 (Utah 1985 
the court held collateral estoppel applied because the issue wai 
whether there was a warranty for the goods. The fact that th( 
materials in question were delivered at different times and th< 
party against whom relief was sought was different did not 
prevent application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. See 
also, Wilde vs. Mid-Century Insurance Company, 635 P. 2d 417 (Utal: 
1981) holding that the decision in an action against a tort-
feasor for wages barred the parties from raising a claim foi 
wages against the provider of the no-fault insurance. 
The doctrine of collateral estoppel has been applied wher 
the issue is whether one is a bona fide purchaser or used bad 
faith in acquiring title. A prior decision on that issue was 
held to be binding in a subsequent action. Moore vs. Sun Lumber 
Company, 276 S.E.2d 797 (W. Va. 1981). The doctrine is also 
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applied in cases involving fraud. In Imen vs. Glassford, 247 
Cal. Rptr. 514, 201 Cal. App. 3d. 898 (1988) the court held that 
a decision by the Real Estate Commissioner that the broker had 
acted fraudulently, collaterally estopped him from defending 
against an action for fraud brought by his client. In Weiner vs. 
Mitchell, Silberbercr and Knupp, 144 Cal. App. 3d 39, 170 Cal. 
Rptr. 533 (1980) the court held that a conviction of securities 
fraud barred the Defendant from denying his fraudulent conduct in 
a subsequent civil action. 
The critical factual issue in both the LOR and Chance Collar 
cases is the same and is governed by the same set of facts. The 
critical question is whether Defendant, Thompson, acquired the 
drill collars as a good faith purchaser or whether he acquired 
them through fraudulent conduct in concert with Lane Murray. The 
facts on that issue are the same. The drill collars were ordered 
by Lane Murray and delivered to the yard owned by Defendant, 
Thompson. (T.37, 55) When LOR and Chance Collar were not paid 
for their drill collars, representatives for those companies, met 
with Mr. Thompson on September 6, 1983. (T.38-39, 56-57) At that 
time he denied that he had any interest or ownership to the drill 
collars and denied knowledge of their whereabouts. (T.41, 58) 
Subsequently, at trial, Mr. Thompson admitted that he had both 
sets of collars moved from his yard to other yards. It was not 
until December 6, 1983 that Mr. Thompson claimed that he owned 
the drill collars. (T.83) That occurred only after LOR had, by 
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court Order, attached its drill collars and Chance Collar ha 
solicited the assistance of the FBI in locating its dril 
collars. Mr. Thompson then claimed that he acquired all of th 
drill collars on August 8, 1983 from Lane Murray and that h 
acquired both sets of drill collars through trading work with Mr 
Murray. (T.135, 169) As proof of his claim to both sets o 
collars he submitted the same records which consisted of a fe 
invoices and checks. The invoice numbers and check numbers wer 
out of sequence and did not support Mr. Thompson's version of th< 
facts. (T.89-91) That factual issue was fully, fairly an< 
competently litigated. Mr. Thompson was represented by counse 
and testified. The jury ruled against him. The issue has bee] 
fully decided and Mr. Thompson should not be allowed to waste th( 
court's time and litigate the issue again. 
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POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT HAD A SUBSTANTIAL RECORD 
FROM THE LOR CASE ON WHICH TO BASE ITS DECISION. 
DEFENDANT DID NOT OBJECT TO OR SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD 
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND THEREFORE, SHOULD NOT BE 
PERMITTED TO CHALLENGE THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE RECORD 
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
Judge Davidson presided at the jury trial in the LOR case 
and was very familiar with the testimony presented, the issues 
raised, the argument of counsel, the instructions given to the 
jury and the decision rendered by the jury. A transcript of that 
trial has been included as part of the record on this Appeal. In 
addition, Judge Davidson had certified copies of the Complaint, 
the Answer to the Counterclaim, Verdict Form, Order and Judgment 
on the Verdict and Jury Instructions from the LOR case prior to 
his signing the Summary Judgment. Those documents are included 
with the record on this Appeal. Judge Davidson had a substantial 
record from the LOR case on which to base his decision in 
granting Summary Judgment in this case. Additionally, the 
Defendant at no time claimed that the record was insufficient to 
make a decision until the filing of his Brief on appeal. 
Defendant, for the first time on appeal, claims that the 
record before the trial court, regarding the LOR case, was 
insufficient for the court to make a decision. The facts do not 
support that claim. The jury verdict in the LOR case was 
rendered on March 27, 1985. (R.196) The Order and Judgment based 
on that decision was rendered April 3, 1985. (R.198) The Motion 
for Summary Judgment in the Chance Collar case was filed on March 
29, 1985. On April 4, 1985 Defendant filed bankruptcy. (R.154) In 
17 
August, 1985 the stay was lifted and on August 22, 1985 Defendan 
filed his reply to the Motion for Summary Judgment. In his repl 
Defendant admitted that the issue was the same, but as hi: 
defense claimed that there were factual differences regardin< 
when two telephone calls made in July of 1983. (R.161) There wai 
no claim made that the record was insufficient for the tria! 
court to make a decision. Defendant did not file any Affidavil 
nor furnish other evidence to change his version of how h« 
claimed to have acquired the drill collars. (R.158) On Septembei 
17, 1985 Chance Collar filed with the court certified copies oi 
documents from the LOR file. Those documents included the 
Complaint, Answer and Counterclaim, the Verdict Form, Jur^ 
Instructions and Order and Judgment on the Verdict. (R.179) Nc 
objection to those documents was filed by the Defendant. On 
October 1, 1985 the court signed and entered its Summary 
Judgment. (R.214) 
The case of Mel Trimble Real Estate vs. Monte Vista Ranch, 
Inc. , 758 P. 2d 451 (Utah 1988) discussed the question of what 
documents are needed from the prior case to support a finding of 
collateral estoppel. In that particular case the only record of 
the prior adjudication was a decision by the Supreme Court. The 
Plaintiff argued that the record was insufficient to support a 
finding of collateral estoppel. The court ruled against Trimble 
on two basis. The court first held that if Trimble believed more 
of the record of the prior proceeding was necessary it was his 
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burden to produce additional documentation. Secondly, the court 
held that his claim should be rejected because the issue was 
never raised before the trial court, but was raised for the first 
time on appeal. Mel Trimble at 455. In the present case, the 
record before Judge Davidson, included his having sat through a 
two (2) day trial and heard the testimony of witnesses and 
argument of counsel, instructed the jury and received their 
decision. He had certified copies of the pleadings, the jury 
instructions and the verdict form. If Defendant felt that was 
insufficient he had the burden to provide any additional 
documentation. Defendant, as in Mel Trimble, did not raise any 
question regarding the sufficiency or adequacy of the record 
before the trial court, but raises that question for the first 
time on appeal. Therefore, his claim should also be denied on 
that basis. 
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POINT III. THE TIMING OF TWO TELEPHONE CALLS IN JULY 
OF 1983 WAS NOT MATERIAL TO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER 
DEFENDANT WAS COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING TO BE 
A GOOD FAITH PURCHASER OF THE DRILL COLLARS. 
Defendant's argument that there are issues of fact regardin 
the timing of two telephone calls in July of 1983 is not materia 
to the issue in this case. Defendant argued to the trial court 
when opposing the Motion for Summary Judgment, that there was < 
dispute regarding the timing of two telephone calls in July o 
1983. (R.158, 161) The trial court held that a contradiction o 
dispute on those facts was not material to the issue that wa: 
critical to decide the Motion for Summary Judgment. The tria 
court's ruling on that question was correct. 
The issue before the trial court, on the Motion for Summary 
Judgment, was whether the Defendant's claim of possession of the 
drill collars in the Chance Collar case was the same issue as 
that in the LOR case and whether the factual situation was the 
same. Defendant, in his Memorandum, (R.158) admitted that th€ 
issue was the same. He made no claim that the telephone calls 
had any bearing on how he acquired the drill collars, but rather 
related to credit information about Lane Murray. The facts 
regarding the acquisition by Defendant of the drill collars is 
the same in both cases. Those facts are that the drill collars 
were delivered to Thompson's yard, that he had the drill collars 
moved and then in September denied any ownership or claim to the 
drill collars. It was not until December that he then claimed to 
own the drill collars. He then claimed to have acquired the 
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drill collars on August 8, 1983 through a series of trades. The 
records Defendant produced did not support that claim. The 
records, the transactions and claims by Defendant, Thompson, 
regarding his acquiring title to the drill collars were identical 
and the legal issue as to whether he was a good faith purchaser 
or acquired the same through fraud was the same. The timing of 
two telephone calls regarding credit information was not related 
to nor material to that issue. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant has litigated and lost his claim that he was 
good faith purchaser of the drill collars. The trial court acte 
properly in ruling that he was barred from relitigating tha 
issue. The decision of the trial court should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted this 2L day of December, 1988. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys^/^or Plaintiff/ 
Respond* 
Ti (0OL..O 
:iark B. Allred 
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ADDENDUM 
ADDENDUM 1 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
The law requires good faith in every business transaction 
id does not allow one to intentionally deceive another by false 
^presentations. Such is referred to as fraud. To constitute 
•aud a person must make a representation of fact which he knows 
be untrue or else is recklessly made, intending to deceive 
tother and the other person relies on the statement resulting in 
.jury or loss. 
0? vff^ *
s 
u\^ 
A <\ 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
Good faith means honesty in fact and the observance of 
reasonable commerical standards of fair dealing in the trade. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. /£ 
A person who acquires title to goods by fraud has voidable 
itle. "Voidable Title" means the seller of the goods has the 
Lght to rescind the transaction and to retake possession of the 
Dods. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
It is an act of fraud to purchase or obtain goods with a 
preconceived intention not to pay for them. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
A person who has voidable title has the power to transfer 
)od title to a good faith purchaser for value. If the person is 
>t a good faith purchaser then he does not acquire good title 
id the seller can retake possession of the goods. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
The Defendant, to qualify as a good faith purchaser, must 
prove that he purchased the drill collars for value and without 
notice of Plaintiff's claim to the drill collars. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. tf 
In order to find in favor of Samuel C. Thompson, you must 
ind from a preponderance the following: 
(1) that Samuel C. Thompson as a good faith purchaser# 
urchased certain drill collars from the defendant, Lane Murray; 
(2) that plaintiff, Lor, Inc., attached the property (drill 
ollars) and that Samuel C. Thompson was not able to use said 
rill collars or otherwise sell or lease them from December 1, 
983 to the date of the stipulated sale; 
(3) that plaintiff wrongfully caused the attachment of the 
rill collars to issue; and 
(4) that the action of Lor, Inc. was wilfull and malicious 
id done with intent to damage Samuel C. Thompson. 
ADDENDUM 2 
XARK B. ALLRED 
ROBERT P. FAUST 
flELSEN & SENIOR 
attorneys for Plaintiff 
63 East Main Street 
ernal, Utah 84078 
elephone: (801) 789-4908 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HANCE COLLAR COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ANE MURRAY dba ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
ALES and SAMUEL C. THOMPSON, 
Defendants. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 12,352 
The above captioned matter came before the Court pursuant to 
laintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment which motion was based on 
tie doctrine of collateral estoppel. The Court having reviewed 
he Motion and Memoranda submitted by both parties and the 
Leadings and documents filed herein, and the Court having 
resided at the trial of LOR, Inc. vs. Lane Murray dba Rocky 
^untain Sales and Samuel C. Thompson, Civil No. 12,386, District 
>urt, Uintah County and being familiar with the file and having 
>ard the testimony and having examined the documents presented 
: the trial of that case, and the Court having reviewed the 
irtified copies from the LOR file and the Court being familiar 
.th the issues raised in the LOR case and the verdict rendered 
i that case, hereby finds as follows: 
1. The issues in the case of LOR, Inc. vs. Murray et al 
related to the ownership of certain drill collars. The issues 
were whether Defendant, Thompson, had acquired title to the drill 
collars as a good faith purchaser or had acquired the drill 
collars through fraud in concert with Defendant, Murray. 
2. The evidence presented in LOR, Inc. vs. Murray showed a 
common scheme whereby Defendants, Murray and Thompson, acquired 
both the LOR Inc. and the Chance Collar Company drill collars by 
fraud. Defendant, Thompson's claim for payment for both sets of 
drill collars was based on the same set of transactions. 
3. At the conclusion of the LOR case, the jury ruled in 
favor of LOR and against Defendant, Thompson. 
4. The issues in this case, Chance Collar Company vs. 
Murray et al are identical to the issues adjudicated in LOR, Inc. 
vs. Murray et al. 
5. The jury, after hearing the evidence, ruled against 
Defendant, Thompson, in the LOR case finding he was not a good 
faith purchaser but had acquired the drill collars by fraud. 
Based on the jury verdict, a final judgment on the merits has 
been entered. 
6. Defendant, Samuel C. Thompson, in the LOR case is the 
same person as Samuel C. Thompson in this case. 
7. The issues presented in both the LOR case and this case 
were completely, fully and fairly litigated at the trial of the 
LOR case. Both parties were represented by their lawyers and 
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vidence regarding both the LOR drill collars and the Chance 
ollar Company drill collars was presented showing the common 
raudulent scheme of acquiring the drill collars by the 
efendants. 
8. The affidavit submitted by Defendant, Thompson, in 
pposition to the Motion For Summary Judgment does not raise any 
aterial issues of fact as it relates to the defense of 
ollateral estoppel. 
9. Based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel, Plaintiff 
s entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
The Court being fully advised, and based on the findings of 
lie Court, it is hereby; 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment is hereby 
ranted. 
2. Plaintiff, Chance Collar Company, is entitled to 
cimediate possession of the 12 slick drill collars, 9" O.D. x 2i" 
,D. x 31.6 ft. long blank ended drill collars being held 
irsuant to the preliminary injunction entered herein and 
ifendant, Thompson, is hereby ordered to deliver immediate 
>ssession of the same to Plaintiff or its representatives and 
le Sheriff of Uintah County, Utah is hereby ordered to assist 
.aintiff in obtaining possession of those drill collars. The 
>nd posted by the Plaintiff as a condition of the preliminary 
ijunction is hereby discharged. 
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3. The counterclaim of Defendant, Thompson, against 
Plaintiff is hereby dismissed. 
4. The issue as to any damages incurred by the Plaintiff 
for two drill collars which were sold prior to entry of the 
preliminary injunction is hereby reserved together with the 
question of costs• 
DATED this / 
.' c7. A r 
day of Soptombep, 1985. 
; 7 / ' J_ 
District Judge 
Richard C. Davidson 
<^zl±\ 
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